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1. Introduction 
In the years leading up to the summer of 2007 when the U.S. subprime crisis 
began to unfold, the world saw a period of relative calm and prosperity after the 
recovery from the dot-com bubble-burst in the early 2000s. While the major 
industrialized nations grew at a modest pace of 1 to 3 percent per annum, the rise of 
the BRIC and other emerging markets gave great impetus to the world’s economic 
progress and spurred high growth in world trade. But the subprime loan problem gave 
way quickly to a broad global crisis marked by slowing economies and dried-up 
liquidity with unprecedented reach. The scope and devastating impacts of the global 
financial crisis were greater than anyone had anticipated. Like a game of dominos, the 
financial crisis started in the United States and spread to the rest of the world. It first 
lacerated the world’s financial systems, then jolted and knocked out the real economy. 
No country was immune to it. Not the “Wealthy Country Club” with member 
countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan. Not the usually resilient East 
Asian NICs. Not even the up-and-coming powerful BRIC group. Among all these, 
countries with a strong export orientation and opened up most to the world, especially 
Japan and the East Asian NICs, were hit the hardest. 
Unlike the 2008 global financial crisis where the impacts were industry- and 
world-wide, the internet crisis, a speculative bubble covering roughly the period 
1998-2001, originated from the accelerated growth in internet related industries and 
therefore tended to be sector-specific in nature. Because of the “get-big-fast” strategy 
adopted by the new internet-based companies and the market confidence on the 
profitable future of these companies, the internet bubble saw rapid run-ups in market 
valuations on these companies (Valliere and Peterson, 2004). When the bubble burst 
in 2000, it was followed by an equally rapid collapse of the markets and led to   3
bankruptcy of many internet firms and huge losses in stock markets. The United 
States, Canada, Asia and Europe all suffered from the sharp drop in stock prices 
during 2000 and 2002. Countries with a heavy reliance on the exports of high-tech 
products such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan saw the global demand for ICT 
products slowing in a weak economic outlook.   
The Asian crisis was somewhat different. It was triggered by the financial crisis 
in a relatively small country (Thailand), where speculation caused funds to drain out 
of Thai currency and stock market.
1 The crisis was then spread to a wide set of 
economies. It crippled East Asian economies throughout the following two years, 
which surprised many due to its rapidity and pervasiveness (Yang & Lim, 2004). By 
mid-1998, most of the economies in Asia were in a crisis of a similar nature. The 
turbulence had also spread beyond the Asian region. Countries such as Russia and 
Brazil showed signs of contagion in 1998; even the U.S. suffered from the collapse of 
some hedge funds,
2 which was once described as the most serious financial situation 
since the post-war-period by the Clinton administration. However, because of the 
intervention by the US Federal Reserve Board, the contagion effects were rather 
limited in scope. 
The above three crises, although different in nature, had all caused the world 
economy to fall. But the extent and the scope of the impacts varied across different 
crises. For the Asian financial crisis, the non-OECD countries, especially Asia, were 
the most negatively affected (Table 1). The GDP growth rates of NICs and ASEAN 
slowed down in 1998 and turned negative in 1999. In the 2001 internet crisis, on the 
other hand, the OECD countries (mainly the advanced industrialized countries) in 
                                                 
1 This is unusual as most of the financial crisis runs from large countries to smaller ones (Goldstein, 
1998). 
2 The U.S. suffered from the $3 billion collapse of the US hedge fund of Long Term Capital 
Management.   4
which bank lending was biased toward internet related industries were hit harder than 
non-OECD countries. Despite the economic downturn in the two crises, the world still 
grew upward but only at a slow motion. The 2008 global financial crisis, however, 
was quite different; the world GDP growth rate had already turned negative in 2009, a 
year after the crisis broke out in 2008.   
The three crises also caused the world exports to contract. Figure 1 and Figure 2 
display the monthly export growth rates for the 27 OECD countries (OECD27) and 
the 6 Asian countries (Asia6) during 1995 to 2009, respectively.
3  As the figures show, 
among the three crises, the 2008 crisis had the most severe impact on the world trade. 
The exports began to fall in the second half of 2008 and quickly rebounded towards 
the end of the first half of 2009, forming a narrow V-shaped pattern of growth 
trajectory. The similar V-shaped pattern was also observed during the internet crisis 
around 2001 and in the Asian financial crisis, where in the latter the V-shaped export 
growth pattern seems to be limited to the Asian region. Moreover, world exports had 
become more volatile with each shock; this is made clear with the V-shaped pattern 
appearing much deeper and narrower in the more recent crisis.   
It is worth noting that during the economic downturns discussed above, the 
contraction in world exports was far greater than that of world GDP, as revealed in 
Table 1 and Table 2. In 1998 and 2001, while real world GDP still grew positively at 
2.35% and 1.65%, respectively, the growth of total exports for the countries such as 
Indonesia, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States had already turned 
negative. The overall export performance was much worse in the recent economic 
                                                 
3  OECD27 refers to the 27 OECD countries, i.e., Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom and United States. Asia6 includes China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Taiwan; other 
Asian countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are not included because some 
of the monthly data are not available.   5
downturn, with almost all countries studied here experiencing negative export growth. 
The total exports for countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Taiwan, even shrank 
at an astounding rate of more than 20% a year after the crisis broke out in 2008. 
Meanwhile real world GDP suffered only a mild decline and growth slowed down to 
-1.86% in 2009. 
A number of papers have identified that fluctuations in exports are highly 
correlated with the changes in worldwide demand, effective exchange rates, the 
volatility of exchange rates (see for example, Boug and Fagereng, 2010; Sapir and 
Sekka, 1995), and FDI (e.g., Zhang and Song, 2000). These determinants (hereafter 
referred to as the fundamental factors) have been shown to govern adequately the 
behavior of the export growth performance of a country in the long run. The fact that 
the decline in world exports was much greater than the decline in world GDP during 
the economic crises suggests that the force causing exports to deviate from their 
long-run trend may have been further magnified by some other factors not accounted 
for in the literature. In other words, the surprisingly large declines in exports may not 
be predicted fully by the conventional relationships linking exports to the fundamental 
factors. Such an unusually large deviation of exports from their long-run level is 
referred to as the “export overshooting phenomenon” hereafter, the main subject of 
this study. 
Based on what we have observed, several testing hypotheses are formulated in 
the paper. Specifically, we look for evidence that addresses the “export overshooting 
phenomenon” during times of economic duress. We also offer some explanations for 
why world exports are so susceptible to economic crises.   
We investigate the export patterns of 37 countries, including 10 Asian countries   6
and 27 OECD countries.
4  The time span being studied covers the period from 1994 to 
2009, in which the world had experienced three economic crises, i.e., the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997, the internet bubble bursting in 2001, and the global financial 
crisis in 2008. These crises, though different in nature and origin, had all led to similar 
V-shaped contraction patterns of world export. It is therefore interesting to examine 
how exports adjusted to these economic shocks and discuss some of the factors that 
may have caused exports to overshoot in each of these downturns.   
The structure of the paper is as follows. We begin with a comparison in terms of 
causes and economic impacts of the three economic crises in Section 2. We then 
derive several testable hypotheses based on the revealed trends and patterns of exports 
during the crisis periods. These hypotheses are then tested in Section 3 using an error 
correction panel regression model. In a dynamic setting, we show how and why the 
response of exports to adverse external shocks may vary across different groups of 
countries and industries. Some explanations as to why, when facing economic crises, 
exports overshot its long-run trend are provided in Section 5. The last section 
summarizes the findings and offers conclusions. 
2. Impact of Economic Crisis on Exports   
Although the three economic crises were triggered by different events such as the 
capital flight out of East Asia, the internet bubble busting, and the subprime crisis, 
they did share some features in common. That is, they all experienced financial 
contagion and had effects on both financial and real sectors.   
                                                 
4 The 10 Asian countries are China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Taiwan. In 2008, the export share of 10 Asian countries and 27 OECD countries accounts 
for about 80% of the world’s total exports. An earlier version of this paper by Liu (2010) which studies 
a smaller sample (9 Asian countries, the U.S. and the EU) and for a shorter time span (2000-2009) will 
be included in the book “The Impact of the Economic Crisis on East Asia” edited by Daigee Shaw and 
Bih Jane Liu, Edward Elgar Publishing LTD., London (forthcoming).   7
Financial crisis often starts as a series of malfunctions in the financial markets, 
leading to credit, exchange, and liquidity crises in a country or a region. Asian 
financial crisis is no exception. Due to the rapid growth of real GDP, the ASEAN 
countries, mainly Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, experienced 
credit boom in the early 1990s. The overextension of credit, which concentrated on 
the areas of real estate and equities, left the Southeast Asian economies vulnerable to a 
shift in credit and cyclical conditions (Goldstein, 1998). As a result, almost all Asian 
currencies confronted various degree of speculative attack after the occurrence of the Thai 
baht crisis in July 1997.
5 When international investors rushed their capital out of the 
Asian markets, the asset prices and currencies fell almost simultaneously. This had led to 
acute economic recession and export contractions in several Asian countries. The 
preponderance of intra-Asia trade link (59.1% in 1997), which had been an important 
driving force behind the rapid regional growth in the first half of the 1990s, became a 
liability as they provided a perfect channel for the contagion to spread swiftly throughout 
Asia (Das, 1999). After the crisis, a large number of Asian banks were weighed down 
because of having massive bad debts and could not make further loans as they were 
not able to meet the 8 percent capital-adequacy ratio stipulated by the IMF. Trade 
credit therefore became one of the biggest supply-side constraints for the exporters in 
Asia. Meanwhile, the extraordinarily large extent of depreciation for many of the 
Asian currencies
6  did not help improve export performance as the traditional wisdom 
suggests. This is because the import content of the Asian exports was inordinately 
high, especially in industries such as electronics and autos. But the volatility of 
                                                 
5  The fact that quite a few Asian countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia, had weakness 
similar to Thailand may help explain this contagion: large currency account deficits, deteriorating 
quality of investment, appreciating real exchange rates, a marked export slowdown in 1996, and 
overexpansion in certain key industries. Even Japan and Korea also faced with massive bad loans and 
serious weakness in its financial sector and in prudential oversight of banks (Goldstein, 1998). 
6  For example, between June 1997 and August 1998 the Indonesian rupiah, Malaysian ringgit and Thai 
baht depreciated by 82.9%, 40.9% and 39.7% against the US dollar, respectively.   8
exchange rates had been shown to be a significant factor negatively affecting exports 
of the Asian economies during the Asian financial crisis. The exports of countries 
outside Asia, however, were less affected by the Asian crisis due possibly to the 
relatively smaller financial contagion and trade linkages and hence small GDP 
contraction as shown in Table 1 and 2. For example, although the U.S. suffered from 
the collapse of hedge funds, the bailout intervention by the Federal Reserve Board did 
prevent a systemic failure of the banking and financial system in the U.S. The 
contractionary impact of the Asian crisis was therefore more subdued.     
The internet bubble (also known as dot-com bubble) was sector-specific in nature. 
It originated from the accelerated growth in internet sectors, which led to the rapid 
run-up in market valuations on the internet related industries. When the bubble burst 
in 2000, it was followed by an equally rapid collapse of the markets and led to 
bankruptcy of many internet firms and huge losses in stock markets. The bubble had 
an important impact on the wealth and the spending habits of consumers, especially 
those in the developed countries. People spent more because they felt richer with their 
overvalued assets; but when their wealth was suddenly reduced once the bubble burst, 
they scaled back on discretionary spending. Changes in discretionary spending are a 
result of the so-called “wealth effect”, which turns out to have important implications 
for the growth of international trade and the global economy. For many 
export-oriented countries, this surge in discretionary spending in developed countries, 
especially in high-tech products, was for a long time a major source of global demand 
for their exports.
7 After the internet bubble bursting and the 9/11 attacks, countries 
with a heavy reliance on the exports of high-tech products such as Japan, Singapore, 
                                                 
7 The export structure in Asia had changed dramatically, from resource-intensive and labor-intensive 
industries to more skilled and more capital-intensive industries. This together with strong intraregional 
links exposed Asian economies to greater risks of external shocks.   9
South Korea and Taiwan saw the global demand for Information, Communication and 
Technology (ICT) products slowing in a weak economic outlook. Similarly, the 
exports of other Asian countries such as Malaysia and the Philippines, which are part 
of the integrated ICT supply chain in the region, were also negatively affected. China, 
meanwhile, still managed to experience positive growth in exports as the volume of 
Chinese high-tech exports constituted only a small part of its external trade at that 
time and hence the impacts were limited.   
Unlike the export contractions seen in 1997 and 2001, which were limited mainly 
to certain region (Asia) or certain industries (high-tech), a shrunken export demand in 
2008 was truly global as a result of a great economic recession unlike any seen since 
the early 1930s. In varying degrees, this great economic recession affected virtually 
every industry and business sector. The reason why the recent economic downturn has 
had far-reaching consequences lies in the rapid proliferation of speculative financial 
innovations fuelled by a torrent of cross-board capital flows that further quickened the 
speed of contagion worldwide (Hu, 2009). As a consequence, the economic impacts 
of a lowered level of world income were felt around the globe, and a collapse in 
export demand across the board quickly followed. This included a plunge in global 
demand for Chinese output. 
In general, exports contracted largely due to the declines in worldwide demand, 
an important growth predictor that has been identified in the trade literature to be one 
of the most significant fundamental factors underlying exports. However, as shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, world trade fell more rapidly than output in varying degrees across 
nations when a crisis occurred. In the 2008 crisis, for example, world GDP fell -1.86% 
from the previous year but exports fell more rapidly, with -18.52% and -22.18% for 
Asia5 and OECD countries, respectively. Similarly, large declines in exports also took   10
place in the two previous crises. With these observations and the distinct V-shaped 
patterns in exports as shown in Figure 1 and 2, we suspect that exports may have 
fallen much more rapidly to an extent far exceeding what can be entirely attributed to 
the changes in fundamental factors. Thus, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: During crisis, exports overshoot the deviation bands allowed by the 
long run equilibrium relationship governed by the fundamental factors. 
In the three episodes of fast falling export demand, the impacts in the 2008 crisis 
were the largest, for the contagion was more severe and truly global, leading to a 
much weaker global demand (Sun, 2009). The drying up of trade credit and traders’ 
overreaction to a possible collapse in demand made the situation even more serious in 
the 2008 crisis (Athukorala and Kohpaiboon, 2009). However, a variety of economic 
stimulus packages were put in place in a timely manner to lessen the negative impact 
thanks to the quick and coordinated responses from the world’s governments in 
containing the spread and further worsening of the crisis. It is therefore reasonable to 
believe that exports would rebound more quickly in the 2008 crisis than in the other 
crises. The export impacts were much greater in the 2001 crisis than in the 1997 crisis. 
The fact that both the extent of the impacts and the speed of rebound increased over 
time can also be observed in Figure 1 and 2, where the V-shaped pattern of the export 
contractions became much narrower in the more recent crisis. Thus, we have:   
Hypothesis 2: Although the degree of export contractions was much sharper in the 
more recent crisis, exports also bottomed out much quicker.   
Moreover, because industries were affected to varying degrees by the three crises 
and their recovery dynamics were also different, we examine how exports were 
impacted at the industry level by classifying a country’s manufacturing industries into   11
two groups, Group A and Group B, based on their industry characteristics. Group A 
consists of industries whose production activities tend to be capital- or 
technology-intensive in nature. Specifically, Group A includes electronics, machinery, 
electrical equipment, ICT (information, communications and technology), 
transportation, and precision instruments. The demand for Group A is highly income 
elastic, and consumer spending on such products tends to follow the ebb and flow of 
the economy. Spending decreases during economic downturns and increases when the 
economy expands. Notice that developed countries are the major buyers of Group A. 
On the other hand, Group B, consisting of all remaining industries,
8 tends to be 
labor-intensive and of necessity in nature. While developing countries are the major 
consumers of Group B, developed countries may reduce their consumption as a result 
of an increase in income. With this in mind, we postulate:   
Hypothesis 3: Group A’s capital- or technological-intensive exports tend to increase 
with the levels of OECD income, while Group B’s labor-intensive exports tend to 
increase with the levels of Non-OECD income. 
3. Empirical Model   
To examine how exports adjust to shocks, we need to explicitly model their 
adjustment by introducing an a-priori long-run equilibrium relationship, with the 
hypothesis that there exists an error correction mechanism that makes the short-run 
deviations to converge on a long-run trend. Therefore, modeling a long-run export 
performance in the context of adjustment to external shocks is inherently dynamic. 
Assume export performance  it E   is affected by a set of fundamental factors  it Z  
                                                 
8 They are textiles, apparel, plywood, paper, furniture, rubbers and plastics, metal products, nonmetal 
products, basic metal, printing, chemical materials, chemical products, and petroleum.   12
and some global shocks (denoted as Crisis). Let the short-run relationship among 
it EX ,  it Z  and  Crisis follow an autoregressive-distributed lag model:   
01 , 2 13 14 , it i t it it t i t EX Z Z EX Crisis                           ( 1 )  
where  it EX  ( i=1, …N, t=1, …, T) is country i’s exports in log form at time t. Crisis, 
which includes 1997Crisis, 2001Crisis, and 2008Crisis, is a period dummy used to 
capture the common shocks from the 1997, 2001 and 2008 crises.  ) ( it i it u v     
includes country-specific variables  i v  and the stochastic error term  it u , where the 
former is to reflect country-specific effect stemming from cross-country differences in 
endowment, technology, and so on. 
Two problems may arise when using panel data regression techniques to 
determine the dynamic relationships between of  it EX  and  it Z  as indicated in 
Equation (1).
9 First, we run into the endogeneity problem caused by the difficulty of 
identifying the unobserved country-specific effects such as technological progress in a 
dynamic setting, in which case the right-hand-side variables are not orthogonal to 
each other. Second, the problem of persistence occurs because  it EX  and  it Z  tend  to 
be highly persistent over time with their respective lagged values and are often jointly 
determined, which is often the case for economic research using time series of 
macroeconomic variables.
10 
An error correction model is therefore adopted, which can be used to solve for 
these two problems. Most importantly, it has the advantage of allowing us to examine 
the short-run and long-run dynamics of the relationship between  it EX  and  it Z , and 
                                                 
9  SeeYasar et al. (2006). 
10  The Durbin-Watson statistic, which is 0.35 for regression (1), suggests the existence of 
autocorrelation.   13
this feature becomes very useful, especially in the context of examining how exports 
behave when an external shock is present.   
11 4 it it it t it EX Z ERROR Crisis                                 ( 2 )  
where    indicates first difference,  11 0 1 1 () it it it ERROR EX Z       is the error 
correction term,  00 3 /(1 )     ,  11 2 3 () / ( 1 )       , and  3 (1 )     . In 
equation (2),  it Z   captures the short-run effects while  1 it ERROR   describes the 
long-run dynamics. Exports could deviate from the long-run equilibrium relationship 
owing to random shocks in the short run, but eventually converge to the equilibrium 
when shocks are absent. The error correction coefficient  , which is negative for 
such a convergence to occur, therefore measures the speed of adjustment toward the 
long-run equilibrium.     
Crisis is used to see whether there exists excessive adjustment in exports that 
cannot be explained by the effects of short-run and long-run dynamics. If the 
coefficient of Crisis is significantly different from zero, then there exists the so-called 
“export overshooting” phenomenon. We indicate the beginning of a crisis using the 
timing of export growth once it turns negative. That is, a crisis begins once negative 
export growth is present in any of the countries in our sample. For example in the 
2001 crisis, Taiwan was the country whose exports fell earlier than those of the others, 
so the month when Taiwan’s export growth first turned negative is defined as the 
starting month of the downturn, which was January 2001. The subsequent months of 
the crisis period are defined as follows: Crisis2001= 2 if February 2001, Crisis2001= 
3 if March 2001…., and Crisis2001=18 if June 2002, when the U.S. was the last 
country to resume positive growth in exports. By adding Crisis and its square term 
(Crisis_SQ), we are able to figure out, on average, how many months it took to reach   14
the trough of the contraction in growth. Crisis1997 and Crisis2008 can be similarly 
defined (see Table 3).
11  
The set of fundamental factors  it Z  affecting a country’s export performance 
includes world demand, effective exchange rate, volatility of exchange rate and FDI 
flows. Here, world GDP is used to measure world demand. As a larger world GDP is 
expected to boost a country’s exports, we expect a positive relationship between the 
two variables. The effective exchange rates, which are trade-weight-based measures 
with weights being time-varying, are obtained from the Bank for International 
Settlements. Since the appreciation of a country’s currency lowers the competitiveness 
of its exports, export volume falls as a result. However, currency appreciation also 
raises export prices. The effect of an increase in EER on export values therefore 
depends on the price elasticity. The effect is positive if products are highly elastic (e.g., 
ICT); but it is negative if products are less elastic (e.g., necessities).   
The volatility of effective exchange rates    is used to capture the impact of 
exchange-rate uncertainty, where    is constructed as the moving average of the 









EER EER  

                                    ( 3 )  
Theoretically, the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports may be positive or 
negative depending on the assumption made with respect to risk preference (De 
Grauwe, 1988). For risk-averse exporters, higher exchange rate volatility increases the 
extent of uncertainty and thus negatively impacts exports. On the contrary, for those 
                                                 
11  Crisis1997= 1 if November 1997 when Japan was the first country among Asia whose export growth 
turned negative, …, and Crisis1997=18 if April 1999, when Korea was the last country to resume 
positive growth in exports. Similarly, Crisis2008= 1 if September 2008 when Taiwan was the first 
country among Asia whose export growth turned negative, …, and Crisis2008=20 if April 2010, when 
Korea was the last country to resume positive growth in exports     15
who are risk-loving, higher exchange rate volatility is often associated with higher 
exports. Moreover, when exports are considered as an option by exporters, exports 
may increase with exchange rate volatility (Boug and Fagereng, 2010). Since 
exporters may be able to reduce or hedge against exchange rate uncertainty, the 
linkage between exchange rate volatility and exports may be insignificant (Solakoglu, 
2008).  
FDI is another factor affecting exports. Whether or not FDI contributes to the 
export performance depends on the motive of FDI. Tariff-jumping FDI, which aims at 
host market, may not help the host country to expand exports. Export-oriented FDI, 
on the other hand, uses a host country as an export platform and may contribute to the 
exports of host countries. Since aggregate FDI is used, of which motivations cannot 
be identified, we have no prior expectation of the sign of FDI.   
We first run the long-run regression  01 it it it EX Z      to derive the error 
correction term ( 11 0 1 1 () it it it ERROR EX Z     
 
), which is then used to run 
Equation (2). The definition and descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized 
in Table 3, while the Error Correction Model results for Regression (2) are reported in 
Table 4.   
4. Regression Results 
Two specifications are reported in Table 4 for the full sample. Specification (1) 
uses world GDP as a measure of world demand, while Specification (2) uses OECD 
and non-OECD GDP, instead. It shows that while non-OECD GDP had positive 
effects on world exports as expected, OECD GDP had negative impacts on exports. 
This suggests that the demand from the non-OECD countries was the driving force 
behind the growth of world exports for the last fifteen years or so. And since OECD   16
and non-OECD GDP have opposite effects on world exports, their sum (i.e., world 
GDP) may not be a good measure of demand for exports; we therefore discuss the 
regression results with OECD and non-OECD GDP as demand-side variables in the 
following. 
Specification (2) in Table 4 shows that the volatility of effective exchange rate, 
which has mixed results in the literature (De Grauwe, 1988), is shown to have 
negative impacts on exports. The real effective exchange rate (EER) is positive but 
FDI inflows are insignificant in the full sample. The error correction term (ERROR) is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that there exists a long-run 
relationship between export performance (EX) and fundamental factors (Z), and that 
the gap between EX and those explained by Z can be closed through the error 
correction mechanism. The speed of the short-run correction ( ) is -0.14, indicating, 
on average, about 14% of the gap is corrected in each month. 
The signs of 2001Crisis and 2008Crisis are negative but the signs of their square 
terms are positive, indicating that there exist remarkable effects of the two crises on 
exports, manifested in striking V-shaped growth patterns. This supports Hypothesis 1 
that exports had contracted excessively during the economic downturns such that 
shrinkage in world demand and changes in other fundamental factors were insufficient 
to explain the fluctuations in exports. For the 1997 crisis, however, the V-shaped 
growth patterns did not occur in the full sample. In fact, the export growth rate even 
increased but at a decreasing rate (as shown by the positive sign of Crisis1997 and the 
negative sign of Crisis1997_SQ), indicating an inversed V-shaped pattern in export 
growth (Specification (2) in Table 4). This confirms the observation that the Asian 
financial crisis did not spread across wide regions of the world and that world exports, 
on average, were still slowly growing in the midst of a crisis.     17
Moreover, Table 4 shows that the V-shaped pattern is significantly deeper and 
narrower in the 2008 crisis than in the 2001 crisis. That is to say, not only did exports 
contract more rapidly, they also rebounded more quickly in the recent crisis. Using the 
coefficients for the crisis variable and its square term, we can calculate the number of 
months for the economies to reach the trough of the economic recession. It shows that 
the 2008 financial crisis bottomed out more quickly than the previous crisis in 2001 
(i.e. 8.24 vs. 9.96 months) for Specification (2). This supports Hypothesis 2 as 
discussed in Section 2. 
The unusual reversed V-shaped export growth pattern, which occurred in the 
1997 crisis for the full sample, may no longer hold when a smaller group of sample is 
used. Four subgroups are considered here, i.e., OECD_DC, OECD_LDC, Asia_DC, 
and Asia_LDC, depending upon whether a country belongs to OECD or Asia, and is 
advanced economy or not as defined by IMF.
12 The results show that while OECD 
subgroups displayed reversed V-shaped pattern in export growth (Table 5), Asian 
countries did experience export overshooting in the 1997 financial crisis (Table 6). 
The results that the exports of Asian countries had fallen excessively but those of 
OECD countries had increased excessively (i.e., the phenomenon of reversed 
overshooting) may be explained by the facts that the 1997 Asian financial crisis was a 
regional shock in nature. The large GDP contraction in Asia and the increasing 
importance of intra-regional trade within Asia significantly contributed to the export 
overshooting. For the 2001 and 2008 crises, export overshooting, however, occurred 
for both OECD and Asian subgroups and was increasing over time, as seen by the 
declining magnitude of the negative estimators associated with the crisis variables. 
Exports also bounced back more quickly over time. For the OECD countries, the 
                                                 
12  See World Economic Outlook. Database: WEO Groups and Aggregates Information, October 2009.   18
number of months it took for the export contraction to bottom out was improving, i.e., 
10.74 and 8.37 months for the 2001 and 2008 crises, respectively; for the Asian 
countries the corresponding figures are 11.71, 9.07, and 7.69 months for the 1997, 
2001, and 2008 crises, respectively (Table 8). These figures reveal an interesting 
conclusion that the Asian economies bounced back more quickly from the crises than 
the OECD countries, a phenomena that deserves further explanation. 
When the Asian sample is further divided into two industry groups, Group A and 
Group B, according to whether the industry is high-tech, more insights emerge (Table 
7). The export overshooting seen for Asian countries in the 1997 crisis was mainly 
due to the excessive fall in exports for Group B rather than for Group A; indeed, the 
exports of Group A did not even fall when controlling for other variables, as indicated 
by the positive (but not significant) sign of Crisis1997. The result is consistent with 
the fact that developed countries, which are the major source of demand for the 
high-tech products, were less affected by the Asian crisis.     
In addition to export overshooting, Group A and Group B also differ in income 
elasticity of exports. Most of income elasticity was positive, consistent with the 
normality assumption of goods. But, exports of Group B, which tend to be of 
necessity in nature, were negatively (although insignificantly) affected by OECD GDP, 
implying that Group B may not be normal goods. Moreover, Group A is more 
sensitive to the OECD’s GDP while Group B is more responsive to the non-OECD’s 
GDP, conforming to Hypothesis 3 discussed in Section 2. The effect of real effective 
exchange rate (EER) is positive for Group A but negative for Group B. This suggests 
that Group B may be more sensitive to price competition than Group A, and the 
depreciation of EER is effective in expanding the exports of Group B. 
The adjustment speed   associated with the error correction term is also   19
different across different industry groups; it is much faster for Group B (-0.24) than 
that for Group A (-0.10). This implies that Group B is more stable than Group A in its 
long-run-export trend, which is consistent with the fact that Group A is highly income 
elastic and tend to have large oscillations around the trend.   
While the exports were hit harder for Group A (mainly the high-tech products) 
than for Group B in the 2001 crisis, the opposite was true in the 2008 crisis. This may 
be due to the fact that compared to the internet bubble around 2001 where the 
high-tech industries were the target of the crisis, the global financial crisis in 2008 
was more widespread such that it affected almost every industry and every country in 
the world. But in both crises, Group A bottomed out more quickly than Group B 
(Table 8).   
5. Some Possible Explanations 
The discussions in Section 4 suggest that export overshooting did occur in the 
2001 and 2008 crises. This holds for the full sample, advanced countries, Asian 
economies, as well as emerging markets, and for the high-tech (Group A) and 
low-tech (Group B) products. Given the fact that the export share of full sample 
studied here accounts for about 80% of world exports in 2008, the above results 
suggest that export overshooting was a world-wide phenomenon when the crises 
occurred. However, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was a regional event and had 
rather limited impact outside Asia, export overshooting therefore occurred only within 
the Asian region.   
Why did the export contraction significantly overshoot its long-run trend when 
an economic crisis occurred in 2001 and 2008? Why did exports fall much deeper and 
yet bounce back much more quickly in the 2008 crisis than in the 2001 crisis? All   20
these questions may be partially explained by the so-called Forrester effect on demand 
variability, a phenomenon well known in the optimization of supply chain and 
inventory control systems.   
The Forrester effect suggests that demand variability increases as one moves up a 
supply chain. It is a feedback mechanism set forth by external shocks to the supply 
chain where small fluctuations in demand at the retailer end are dramatically 
amplified as they proceed up the chain. Such an effect may be caused by the demand 
forecast updating that reflects not only the need to replenish the stocks to meet the 
requirements for future demands but also the need for safety stocks which are 
considered necessary because of the large demand uncertainty and fluctuation (Lee et 
al., 1997). As a result, the readjustment of demand forecast by the upstream manager 
is often greater than the change of demand in the downstream. Similarly, periodic 
ordering (which makes suppliers face a highly erratic stream of orders), special sales 
promotion (which triggers irregular buying pattern of customers) and rationing (which 
occurs when demands exceed supply) may all distort demand information (Lee et al., 
1997). Inaccuracies and volatility of orders from the retailer to the primary suppliers 
therefore cause relatively greater readjustments at each point of the chain. Apparently, 
the amount of safety stock contributes significantly to the Forrester effect. As in the 
visual metaphor of cracking a bullwhip, demand in the chain fluctuates in a 
continuous and long lasting oscillatory movement upstream; therefore, it is also 
labeled the bullwhip effect.   
To make things clear, consider a 10% drop in retail sales. In order to deplete the 
surplus stocks and reduce inventory, given that there is now a weaker sales outlook, 
orders placed by retailers to wholesalers one step upstream in the chain will thus 
decrease by more than 10%, say 15%. The decrease in demand amplifies and   21
propagates through the chain as upstream firms react in much the same way as 
downstream firms do, trying to adjust their stock level and empty the pipeline. Hence 
the longer the supply chain is, the more pronounced the upstream demand 
amplification (or the larger the oscillatory movement) will become. This will result in 
an even greater decrease, say 20%, in purchase orders to the suppliers further 
upstream in our example.   
The “export overshooting” phenomenon as seen in OECD and Asian economies 
in the 2001 and 2008 crises, in essence, captures the bullwhip effect. While the real 
world GDP fell only mildly in 2001 and 2009, exporting countries, constituting the 
upper stream end of the global supply chain, had experienced a much greater fall in 
exports which cannot be fully explained by the changes in consumer demand as well 
as other fundamental factors such as exchange rates, the volatility of exchange rates 
and FDI (Table 4 to Table 7). The adjustment of inventory and the overcorrection of 
the demand forecast by every entity in the global supply chain was indeed the force at 
work that caused manufacturing orders (exports) to fall more than the decline in 
demand at the retailer end of the chain. Table 9 provides some evidence from Taiwan 
to support this argument. It summarizes the growth rates of export orders and 
inventory for the upstream (electronic parts and components) and the downstream 
(computers, electronic and optical products) in Taiwan. It shows that when the crisis 
occurred in the late 2008 and exerted its negative impact throughout 2009, the 
downstream industry reacted to demand contraction by depleting its inventory first, as 
indicated by the quickly fall in the growth rate of its inventory in the late 2008. Thus, 
while the orders placed by foreign buyers on both the upstream and downstream 
industries were contracted, the orders on the upstream fell more than those on the   22
downstream.
13 Similar results can also be observed during 2001-2002 when the 
internet bubble took effect. 
When the economy recovered, the bullwhip effect also worked in much the same 
way but in the opposite direction; exports bounced back by a much larger extent than 
the actual increase in demand as every entity of the supply chain increased its safety 
stocks to meet unexpected increase in future demand. This can also be observed from 
Table 9: the extent of rebound in export orders received by the Taiwanese firm was 
larger for the upstream than for the downstream in 2003-2004 and in the late 2009 
when economy showed signs of recovery after 2001 and 2008 crises.   
The reason why the extent of export overshooting increased over time as shown 
in the previous section may be explained by an increasing specialization of production 
vertically over time. Generally, when production becomes more specialized vertically 
around the world, the length of a supply chain increases, and so does the extent of the 
bullwhip effect (or the extent of overshooting). As already discussed earlier, bullwhip 
effect causes modest changes at one end of the chain to be magnified with a 
fast-cascading impact when reaching the other end. This means literally that the 
longer the supply chain, the larger the demand swings for the upstream end of the 
chain. Therefore, as the degree of cross-border vertical specialization increases over 
time, the demand variability is also increased in an elongated chain, and thus 
enhancing the global supply system’s tendency to overcorrect. This helps explain why 
the overshooting phenomenon was more pronounced in the 2008 crisis than in the 
2001 crisis. The findings from Vlasenko (2009) that firms’ inventory levels were 
quickly deteriorating in the 2008 crisis at a faster speed than the average rate in the 
                                                 
13 Note that due to the lack of foreign data, we assume the downstream industry in foreign country 
adjusts its inventory in much the same way as that in Taiwanese. This assumption is plausible as 
Taiwan is the major supplier of electronics and ICT products.   23
previous recessions provide some evidence of an increasing overcorrection in the 
supply system. This in turn, we believe, had led to an increase in the extent of 
overshooting (bullwhip effect), supporting our argument that the recent financial crisis 
was worse than the previous crisis in terms of the rates of decline in world exports.   
The above bullwhip effect can be used to explain why high-tech industries 
(Group A) bottomed out more quickly than low-tech industries (Group B). Since 
high-tech industries tend to be more sophisticated and have a supply chain longer than 
low-tech industries, the economic crisis will have a bigger export impact on high-tech 
than on low-tech in terms of the speed of fall and the pace of rebound according to the 
above discussion. This also helps explain why Asian exports bounced back more 
quickly than the crisis than OECD countries as shown by the regressions in Section 4, 
as Asian countries are the major high-tech exporters.
14 
6. Concluding Remark 
This paper provides some evidence of the “export overshooting” phenomenon, 
i.e. the unusually large deviation of exports from their long-run level, which can not 
be fully explained by the fundamental factors such as the changes in worldwide 
demand, effective exchange rates, the volatility of exchange rates and FDI. We show 
that export overshooting that had occurred in the 2001 and 2008 economic crises was 
a world-wide phenomenon. In fact, it prevailed in all of the 37 countries in our sample 
that represent different income groups: developed countries, Asian NICs, and 
emerging market countries. But for the 1997 crisis which was a regional financial 
crisis in nature, export overshooting only occurred within the Asian region and did not 
spread beyond Asia. 
                                                 
14  While the high-tech export share for EU and US were 49% and 55% during 2000-2007, respectively, 
the corresponding figure for the Asian economies studied in this paper was 58%.     24
We argue that the bullwhip effect was indeed a driving force behind the “export 
overshooting” phenomenon. Because of the adjustment in inventory and 
overcorrection in demand forecast by every entity of the supply chain when facing a 
shock (economic crisis), exporting countries, which were at the upstream end of the 
supply chain, faced a much greater demand oscillation than the demand at the retailer 
end. As a result, exports fell more than demand at the retail end; but when the 
economy recovered exports also bounced back by a larger extent than the change in 
final demand. The export overshooting phenomenon discussed in this paper may 
therefore be regarded as a magnified version of the bullwhip effect in world exports, 
which was triggered by the large negative aggregate demand shocks resulting from 
the global economic crises.     
The extent of overshooting, however, changes overtime and differs across 
industries. As production becomes more vertically specialized across countries over 
time (Hummels et al., 1998), the supply chain becomes longer accordingly. A longer 
supply chain implies larger demand variability and bigger export fluctuations when 
economic crisis occurs. This helps explain why the extent of export overshooting was 
greater and the rebound of exports was also quicker in the 2008 crisis as compared to 
the 2001 crisis. Moreover, high-tech industries tend to have longer supply chain and 
hence face larger demand variability. The speed of fall and the pace of rebound in 
exports were therefore faster in the high-tech industries than in the low-tech industries. 
As Asian countries were the major high-tech exporters, this also helps explain why 
Asian exports bounced back more quickly than OECD exports.   
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Table 1 Growth Rate of GDP for OECD, Non-OECD and the World, 1995-2009 
Year World  OECD  Non-OEC
D 
Asian 
NICs  ASEAN  Latin 
America 
1995  2.81 2.47 4.40  8.11 8.27 3.21 
1996  3.21 2.83 4.85  7.31 8.26 2.94 
1997  3.61 3.34 4.66  6.28 7.38 4.72 
1998  2.35 2.46 1.93  5.24 4.21 1.23 
1999  3.25 3.27 3.20  -3.33 -6.67 -1.21 
2000  4.28 4.03 5.39  6.91 4.20 2.76 
2001  1.65 1.23 3.40  7.81 6.62 0.41 
2002  2.02 1.55 4.02  1.28 1.93 -0.63 
2003  2.67 1.89 6.00  5.57 4.97 1.97 
2004  3.92 3.03 7.59  3.13 5.53 6.90 
2005  3.52 2.58 7.08  5.87 6.53 5.09 
2006  4.09 2.98 7.85  4.78 5.81 5.56 
2007  4.03 2.67 8.18  5.71 6.11 6.56 
2008  1.95 0.44 6.09  5.68 6.47 5.20 
2009  -1.86 -3.41 2.01  1.94 4.32 -0.33 
Source: Global Insight. 
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Table 2:    1995-2009 Growth Rates of Exports by Country, % 
Year Asia5*  Taiwan  Japan  Korea  China  Indonesia 
1995 17.59    20.00  11.5 30.53 25.46 13.49 
1996 -1.93      3.57  -7.13 4.03 1.52 9.83 
1997 6.64      4.40 2.59 4.74  20.98 7.28 
1998 -5.53    -8.72 -7.7  -2.65 0.55 -8.6 
1999 7.49    10.07 7.82 8.14 6.22  -0.37 
2000 19.64    21.67 13.98 20.41  27.7 27.66 
2001  -10.06    -17.06 -15.45 -12.48  6.89  -9.34 
2002  9.38      6.65 3.16 7.54  22.24 1.49 
2003  19.83    10.34 13.08 19.15 34.65  6.82 
2004  25.31    21.03 19.56 31.03 35.39 17.24 
2005  14.68   8.38  5.52 12.01 28.41 19.66 
2006  19.18    12.72  8.8 14.38 27.15 17.67 
2007  18.49    10.19 10.44 14.21 25.67  13.2 
2008  13.49   3.63  8.22 13.65  17.3 20.09 
2009  -18.52    -20.32 -24.77  -14.5 -15.87 -14.97 
        
Year OECD**  US  UK  France  Germany  Italy 
1995  19.89    14.07 17.96 22.19 22.20    13.35 
1996  6.25   6.9  8.32   1.12   0.35   15.92 
1997  2.75   10.25  7.07   -2.18  -2.14   -2.97 
1998  1.99   -1.02  -3.10  5.98   5.50   0.64 
1999  1.96   2  -0.95  1.61   -0.40   -3.71 
2000  6.66   12.38  5.51   1.15   2.13   3.65 
2001  -1.15   -6.75  -4.28  -1.11  3.87   1.56 
2002  3.41   -4.93  2.54   2.44   7.74   3.69 
2003  14.40   2.93  9.59   18.39  22.11   18.27 
2004  18.08    13.19 13.39 14.49 20.04    16.53 
2005  8.25   10.79  10.02  2.73   7.09   6.49 
2006  14.95   14.36  16.98  7.65   14.66   12.71 
2007  14.55   11.27  -2.04  11.11  19.12   19.04 
2008  11.68   14.63  4.41   11.48   9.56   8.36 
2009  -22.18   -18.12  -23.65   -21.28   -22.51   -25.93 
Note: * including China, Indonesia, Korea, Japan and Taiwan.   
** excluding Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, and Slovak Republic.   
Source: OECD International Trade and World Trade Atlas. Statistics were constructed using the monthly 
merchandise trade series. 
   30
Table 3:    Variable Statistics and Definition—Full Sample 
 
Variables Definition  Mean  Standard 
Deviation
    EX  Monthly exports, in log; data sources: 
SourceOECD and World Atlas. 
20.41 5.23 
    EX_GroupA  Monthly exports for electronics, machinery, 
electrical equipment, transportation, and 
precision instruments; in log 
9.31 1.19 
    EX_GroupB  Monthly exports for textiles, apparel, plywood, 
paper, furniture, rubbers and plastics, metal 
products, nonmetal products, basic metal, 
printing, chemical materials, chemical products, 
and petroleum; in log 
8.63 1.11 
  GDP_world   World  GDP,  quarterly,  in  log  10.62  0.14 
    GDP_oecd  OECD GDP, quarterly, in log  10.39  0.11 
    GDP_xoecd  Non-OECD GDP, quarterly, in log  9.03  0.24 
     Volatility of effective exchange rates, in log  0.04  0.05 
  EER  Effective  exchange  rates, in log  4.61  0.03 
    FDI  Inward direct investment (10
3 billions)  0.02 0.04 
    Crisis1997  =1, if 11/1997; =2, if 12/1997; =2+i , if the ith 
month of 1998;=14+j, if the jth month of 1999; 
j=1, 2, 3, 4; =0, otherwise 
0.89 3.20 
Crisis1997_SQ Square  term  of Crisis1997  11.03  46.38 
Crisis2001 
=i, if the ith month of 2001; = 12+j, if the jth 
month of 2002, j=1, 2…, 6; =0 otherwise 
0.91 3.22 
Crisis2001＿SQ  Square term of Crisis2001  11.17  46.54 
Crisis2008  =1, if 9/2008; =2, if 10/2008; =3, if 11/2008; =4, 
if 12/2008;=4+i, if the ith month of 2009; =0, 
otherwise 
1.00 3.47 
Crisis2008＿SQ  Square term of Crisis2008  13.04  53.07 
OECD_DC 
=1, if Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
United States 
0.62 0.49 
OECD_LDC  =1, if Hungary, Mexico, Poland and Turkey  0.11  0.31 
Asia 
=1, if China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand  
0.28 0.45   31
Table 4:    Error Correction Model—Full Sample 
 








ERROR Correction  -0.16  (0.01)
***   -0.14  (0.01)
***   
GDP_World -0.08  (0.22)
        
GDP_OECD     -2.28  (0.18)
***   
GDP_XOECD   2.52  (0.11)
***   
EER_volatility  0.03 (0.04)      -0.13 (0.03)
***   
EER 0.18  (0.02)
***    0.12  (0.02)
***   
FDI  0.06 (0.06)      0.07 (0.05)     
Crisis1997 -0.02  (0.002)
***    0.004  (0.002)
**   
Crisis1997_SQ/100 0.05  (0.01)
***    -0.03  (0.01)
***   
Crisis2001 -0.04  (0.002)
***    -0.03  (0.002)
***   
Crisis2001_SQ/100 0.20  (0.01)
***    0.17  (0.01)
***   
Crisis2008 -0.12  (0.004)
***    -0.12  (0.004)
***   
Crisis2008_SQ/100 0.71  (0.03)
***    0.74  (0.02)
***   
constant 0.13  (0.01)
 ***   0.03  (0.01  ) 
R-Square: Within  0.6085  0.6505 
R-Square: Between  0.0241  0.0248 
R-Square: Overall  0.2091  0.2566 
No. of Observations  5660  5660 
No. of Countries  37  37 
Note: Full sample includes 10 Asian countries and 27 OECD countries.   32




















ERROR Correction  -0.17  (0.01)
***   -0.18  (0.01)
***   -0.12  (0.02)
***  
GDP_OECD -3.03  (0.21)
***   -2.67  (0.23)
***   -3.11  (0.50)
***  
GDP_XOECD 2.69  (0.13)
***   2.50  (0.14)
***   3.60  (0.35)
***  
EER_volatility  -0.05 (0.05)    0.12 (0.08)    -0.21 (0.07)
***  
EER 0.23  (0.02)
***   0.34  (0.03)
***   0.06  (0.03)
**  
FDI  0.01 (0.05)    0.03 (0.05)    0.07 (0.51)   
Crisis1997 0.01  (0.002)
 *** 0.01  (0.002)
 *** 0.02  (0.004)
*** 
Crisis1997_SQ/100 -0.04  (0.01)
 ***   -0.03  (0.01)
 **   -0.12  (0.03)
***  
Crisis2001 -0.03  (0.002)
***   -0.03  (0.002)
*** -0.02  (0.005)
*** 
Crisis2001_SQ/100 0.12  (0.01)
***   0.12  (0.01)
***   0.07  (0.03)
**  
Crisis2008 -0.13  (0.005)
***   -0.12  (0.01)
***   -0.13  (0.01)
***  
Crisis2008_SQ/100 0.77  (0.03)
***   0.72  (0.03)
***   0.81  (0.07)
***  
constant 0.04  (0.01)
 ***   0.02  (0.01)
*   -0.02  (0.03)  
R-Square: Within  0.6537  0.6470  0.7347 
R-Square: Between  0.0879  0.0840  0.9151 
R-Square: Overall  0.2085  0.1613  0.6807 
No. of Observations  4129  3562  628 
No. of Countries  27  23  4 
  Note: OECD includes all the OECD countries except Japan and Korea. 
OECD_LDC includes Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey.   
      OECD_DC  includes  OECD  but  excludes  OECD_LDC. 
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ERROR Correction  -0.09  (0.01)
***   -0.24  (0.02)
***   -0.06  (0.02)
***  
GDP_OECD 0.59  (0.30)
**   1.87  (0.38)
**   -0.42  (0.43)  
GDP_XOECD 1.65  (0.20)
***   1.18  (0.25)
***   2.08  (0.28)
***  
EER_volatility -0.13  (0.05)
***   0.08  (0.08)  -0.29  (0.06)
***  
EER -0.06  (0.02)
***   0.03  (0.04)   -0.14  (0.03)
***  
FDI -0.51  (0.37)    -2.29  (0.55)
***   -0.64  (0.49)  
Crisis1997 -0.02  (0.004)
***   -0.02  (0.005)
*** -0.01  (0.01)
***  
Crisis1997_SQ/100 0.08  (0.02)
***   0.12  (0.03)
***   0.04  (0.03)  
Crisis2001 -0.05  (0.003)
***   -0.06  (0.004)
*** -0.05  (0.004)
*** 
Crisis2001_SQ/100 0.30  (0.02)
***   0.33  (0.02)
***   0.26  (0.02)
***  
Crisis2008 -0.09  (0.01)
***   -0.07  (0.01)
***   -0.11  (0.01)
***  
Crisis2008_SQ/100 0.60  (0.04)
***   0.47  (0.05)
***   0.69  (0.06)
***  
constant 0.03  (0.01)
 **   0.01  (0.02)
*   0.04  (0.02)
***  
R-Square: Within  0.7368  0.8385  0.6966 
R-Square: Between  0.0050  0.4012  0.6526 
R-Square: Overall  0.5696  0.6020  0.5159 
No. of Observations  1470  594  876 
No. of Countries  10  4  6 
Note: Asia includes China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Taiwan. 
Asia_DC includes Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
Asia_LDC includes Asia but excludes Asia_DC.     




  Table 7:    Error Correction Model for the Asia Sample by Manufacturing Group   
 




  Coeff.  Standard  
Error  Coeff.  Standard  
Error 
ERROR Correction  -0.11 (0.01)
***   -0.24  (0.02)
***   
GDP_OECD  3.36 (0.42)
***    -0.51  (0.38)  
GDP_XOECD  0.94 (0.32)
***    3.05  (0.29)
***   
EER_volatility  -0.55 (0.07)
***    -0.03  (0.06)   
EER  0.07 (0.03)
*   -0.08  (0.03)
**   
FDI  0.19 (0.35)      1.61 (0.33)
***   
Crisis1997  0.003 (0.01)
     -0.01  (0.01)
*  
Crisis1997_SQ/100  -0.03 (0.04)      0.03 (0.04)     
Crisis2001  -0.05 (0.005)
***    -0.04  (0.004)
***  
Crisis2001_SQ/100  0.30 (0.03)
***    0.19  (0.03)
***   
Crisis2008  -0.03 (0.01)
***    -0.08  (0.01)
***   
Crisis2008_SQ/100  0.23 (0.05)
***    0.49  (0.04)
***   
constant  -0.02 (0.02) -0.04  (0.02)
 ** 
R-Square: Within  0.5336 0.6329 
R-Square: Between  0.0154 0.0036 
R-Square: Overall  0.3255 0.3070 
No. of Observations  1369 1369 
No. of Countries  9 9 
Note: Group A includes electronics, machinery, electrical equipment, ICT, transportation, and precision 
instruments. Group B includes textiles, apparel, plywood product, paper, furniture, rubbers and plastics, 
metal products, nonmetal products, basic metal, printing, chemical materials, chemical products, and 
petroleum.   35
Table 8:    Number of Months to Bottom Out 
 
  1997 2001  2008 
Full Sample  -  9.97  8.24 
OECD Countries:  -  10.74  8.37 
OECD_DC -  10.68  8.43 
OECD_LDC -  11.72  8.17 
G6 -  11.48  8.45 
Asian Countries:  11.71 9.07  7.69 
Asia_DC  10.44 9.23  7.46 
Asia_LDC  15.08 8.96  7.75 
Group A  4.91 8.37  6.67 
Group B  15.97 10.58  8.43 
Source: The author’s calculation.   36
Table 9 Export Orders and Inventory for P&C and ICT Industries in Taiwan 
 
  Upstream Industry 
(Electronic Parts and Component)
Downstream Industry 
(Computers, Electronic   
& Optical Products)   
  Order Inventory Order Inventory 
2000  54.05   31.09  17.88   18.42 
2001  -23.64   24.84  -12.31   8.84 
2002 11.33    -15.05  24.46    25.45 
2003  16.54   14.60  15.98   -22.24 
2004  38.76   20.67  15.12   14.68 
2005  21.60   26.31  24.52   16.89 
2006  20.35   16.29  23.04   -14.30 
2007  15.46   3.96 21.41   9.40 
2008 M01  16.28  6.74  7.62  0.45 
M02 22.79  13.18  3.52  5.36 
M03 15.10  18.70  8.04  7.83 
M04 18.07  21.70  19.71  12.6 
M05 17.91  28.06  17.64  17.13 
M06 9.83  24.69  11.97  10.11 
M07 8.60  30.99  15.74  10.86 
M08 4.22  43.37  12.08  3.54 
M09 3.18  55.15  10.61  2.27 
M010 -1.73  46.97  11.9  0.17 
M011 -27.7  58.41  -11.52  2.86 
M012 -30.84  39.55  -23.14 3.62 
2009 M01  -38.85  31.19  -30.47  6.78 
M02 -22.33  21.55  -10.57 0.74 
M03 -16.60  13.24  -18.56  -3.24 
M04 -14.76 7.32  -16.25  -10.49 
M05 -11.33 4.27  -11.90  -6.58 
M06 -6.12  1.15  2.87  -4.04 
M07  -7.97 -4.16 -3.64 -1.88 
M08 -12.2  -13.08  -9.07  -1.86 
M09 -0.24  -15.42  2.41  -1.12 
M010  4.06 -9.58  5.64 -0.83 
M011 43.23  -13.03  33.91  -3.93 
M012  53.08 -9.03 61.53 -8.85 
Source: Calculated from Yearbook of Industrial Production Statistics, Taiwan Area, the Republic of 
China, complied by Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, various issues.   37
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Sources: OECD; World Trade Atlas; and Taiwan's Bureau of  Foreign Trade.
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